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Aim To characterize the patterns of competition for a sam-
ple of drugs in the Portuguese pharmaceutical market be-
fore (January 2002-March 2003) and after (April 2003-June 
2003) the introduction of the reference pricing system 
(RPS).
Methods We performed a descriptive, retrospective, lon-
gitudinal analysis, with monthly observations from Janu-
ary 2002 until June 2003 of 15 homogeneous groups. The 
groups represented the upper limit of public pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure in the RPS segment in 2003 (n = 270). Mea-
sures of competition were: 1) number of presentations; 2) 
prescriptions’ concentration in the generic and origina-
tor (brand) segments, using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI); and 3) dominant positions of market leader in the 
homogeneous group. A correlation analysis between the 
number of presentations, the HHI, and the dominant po-
sition of the market leader was performed using Pearson 
coefficient of correlation.
Results The structure of the market changed with the in-
troduction of RPS. We found an increasing number of ge-
neric presentations (from 4 ± 3 to 7 ± 4; mean ± standard 
deviation) and a decrease in the HHI for the generics mar-
ket segment (from 0.7 ± 0.2 to 0.6 ± 0.3). There was a nega-
tive correlation between those variables that increased af-
ter the introduction of RPS (from -0.6 to -0.8). The HHI for 
brands and the dominant positions remained unchanged.
Conclusion After the implementation of RPS, the in-
creased competition was mainly driven by economic and 
social agents in the generics market segment but not in 




FORUM430 Croat Med J. 2009; 50: 429-39
www.cmj.hr
Reference Pricing System (RPS) is a drug reimbursement 
system in which the third payer defines the price that they 
will support for a group of interchangeable drugs (1). The 
difference between the public price and the reimbursed 
price will be borne by the patients. The system was intro-
duced in March 2003. It intends to foster generic com-
petition as a way to promote rational containment of in-
creasing pharmaceutical expenditure. In fact, according 
to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) data, pharmaceutical expenditure in Portu-
gal in the year before the reform was 23.3% of total health 
expenditure. This value is higher than the average value in 
OECD countries, which was 17.2% in the same period (2).
In Portugal, pharmaceutical prices are regulated but phar-
maceutical companies are free to decrease the prices of 
drugs. Physicians have the exclusive right to issue prescrip-
tions; however pharmaceutical professionals may consider 
the possibility of substitution at consumer’s request only, if 
this is explicitly allowed by physicians.
RPS is based on homogeneous groups of drugs. The ho-
mogeneous group consists of drugs with the same com-
position of active substances for which there are marketed 
generics. The formation of homogeneous group was sub-
ject to the principle of exchange of drugs with the same 
therapeutic effect, ie, drugs that have the same dosage 
of active substances and similar pack size. The threshold 
for the state support, the reference price, is defined by the 
public price of the highest priced generic drug in each ho-
mogeneous group. The patient must pay the difference 
between the reference and public prices, when choosing a 
drug which costs more than the reference price.
According to Aronson et al (3), this system can induce a 
rapid decrease in the public retail price of brand name 
drugs, allowing a control of pharmaceutical expenditure 
in the short run. Also, copayments can affect the demand 
through substitution or income effects, “because some-
thing that was previously available free of charge now in-
volves a cost to the patient, although the reference drug is 
still free to the patient” (4).
Schneeweiss et al (5) consider that “this is one of the only 
drug cost containment policies [...] that saved substantial 
costs without unintended outcomes on patient health sta-
tus or use of expensive services.” These characteristics of 
RPS are also highlighted by Maclure (6), when saying that 
“a cap like maximum allowable costs for one drug class in 
which prices vary widely, can result on little or no ad-
verse health effects.” Increasingly, the practice of substitution 
of branded drugs by the equivalent generic drugs guaran-
tees the necessary conditions to promote efficiency through 
lower price drugs, by ensuring the same criteria of quality, 
safety, and final outcome of the pharmaceutical care.
According to Pammolli (7), the efficiency can be ensured by 
“generic competition, as an instrument for reducing prices 
and countervailing exclusivity power granted by patents,” 
and “as for industrial policy and competitiveness issues, an 
increased market competition in the off-patent segment of 
the market can contribute to foster efficiency and to design 
adequate incentives to innovate [...] promoting patterns of 
industrial reorganization and selection and, moreover, al-
lowing higher prices and returns on investment for innova-
tive products that are still on patent.” Also, according to Glis-
sandi et al (8) “most of the main recent structural reforms 
involve off-patent active substances and aim at increasing 
competition among equivalent products,” as in the RPS to-
gether with the pharmacist’s right to substitution.
This research was developed in order to explain the impact 
of RPS on the Portuguese pharmaceutical market structure, 
and to investigate whether the number of presentations 
changed after the introduction of RPS, and if the change 
was observed for both generics and brands segments. The 
aim of the study was to analyze drug pattern utilization, 
ie, the prescription concentration in generics and brands 
segments, and the dominant position of market leader. In 
fact, when new chemically similar presentations enter the 
market, the Portuguese law requires that they must have a 
lower price. So, they can be perceived as potential substi-
tutes by social agents and foster competition by decreas-
ing prescription concentration. If the drugs with lower 
prices prove to be perfect substitutes, their impact will also 
decrease the dominant position of the market leader.
Methods
data sources
The data were collected monthly between January 2002 
and June 2003 for 15 homogeneous groups (n = 270) by 
the Sub-Regions of Health and presented to National Insti-
tute of Pharmacy and Drugs (INFARMED).
sample
The research was based on consumption data of 10 drugs 
that are classified according to the Anatomical Therapeutic 
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Chemical classification system, which is recommended by 
World Health Organization (9) for international drug utiliza-
tion studies. They belong to 15 homogeneous groups that 
represent the upper limit of RPS public pharmaceutical 
expenditure in 2003. We studied large and medium pack-
ages of omeprazole, captopril, lisinopril, and simvastatine 
(8 groups), two dosages of ranitidine (2 groups), and one 
package and one dosage of 5 drugs (5 groups).
The sample consisted of the following active substances 
(Table 1): 1) 2 antiulcer agents – ranitidine (antagonist of H2 
receptors) and omeprazole (proton pump inhibitor); 2) 1 
platelet aggregation inhibitor – ticlopidine; 3) 4 antihyper-
tensive agents that inhibit angiotensin converting enzyme 
– captopril, enalapril, lisinopril, enalapril/hydrochlorothi-
azide; 4) 1 lipid modifying agent – simvastatin (hydroxi-
metylglutaril coenzyme A reductase inhibitor); 5) 1 anti-
microbial agent – ciprofloxacin (fluoroquinolone); and 6) 
1 antidepressant agent – fluoxetine (selective serotonine 
reuptake inhibitor).
Variables
The study was divided in 2 phases: before (January 2002-
March 2003) and after the introduction of RPS (April 2003-
June 2003). The following variables were considered: 1) the 
number of competing presentations in the homogeneous 
group; 2) concentration of prescriptions, calculated using 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the 15 homoge-
neous group in relation to the prescription of brand name 
drugs and in terms of generic drugs; and 3) the domi-
nant positions of the market leader in the homogeneous 
group.
Methods to measure competition
Generic competition, and subsequent price decreases, 
could be improved by increasing the number of presenta-
tions on the market, especially when this market segment 
is not well developed. In Portugal, in 2002 the share of ge-
nerics was only 5.59% of the total value of the pharmaceu-
tical market (10).
Also, the potential increase in copayment may stimulate 
the segment of price-sensitive consumers, and thus serve 
as an incentive for generics market access and consump-
tion. Ekelund (11) and Moreno-Torres et al (12) showed, 
however, that RPS can restrain the entry of new generics 
presentations. There is no evidence on this effect in the 
Portuguese market.
The necessary conditions to allow efficient competition 
have been established in the industry, both from the the-
oretical and empirical perspective (13). The authors pro-
posed that at least one of the following situations should 
be in place: 1) there should be at least 5 comparable com-
petitors in the market; 2) none of the competitors should 
occupy a dominant position, which means that the mar-
table 1. Characteristics of the sample according to anatomic therapeutic Chemical Classification, homogenous group, dosage, pack 









A02BA antagonists of H2 receptors 124 Ranitidine 150 40-89 0.49
126 Ranitidine 300 40-89 1.13
A02BC proton pump inhibitors 120 Omeprazole  20 20-39 1.15
121 Omeprazole  20 40-89 1.14
B01AC platelet aggregation inhibitors 136 Ticlopidine 250 40-89 0.45
C09AA angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors  31 Captopril  25 40-89 0.23
 32 Captopril  25 >89 0.22
 68 Enalapril  20 40-89 0.81
 95 Lisinopril  20 40-89 0.43
 96 Lisinopril  20 >89 0.39
C09BA angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors 
and diuretics combination
 64 Enalapril: Hydrochlorothiazide  20:12.5 40-89 0.41
C10AA HMGCoA reductase inhibitors 127 Simvastatin  20 20-39 1.01
128 Simvastatin  20 40-89 0.80
J01MA fluoroquinolones  52 Ciprofloxacin 500 >13 1.30
N06AB selective serotonine reuptake inhibitors  76 Fluoxetine  20 40-89 0.59
*anatomic therapeutic Chemical Classification (9).
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ket leader should not possess a market share above 40% 
without the existence of any competitive products with 
the same characteristics; and 3) the admission into the dif-
ferent segments of the market should be free.
Another approach to measure competition is presented by 
Besanko et al (14) who consider that the intensity of com-
petition depends on the market structure as measured by 
the HHI. This index equals the sum of the squared market 
shares of all the drugs in the market. When HHI is below 
0.2 there is a perfect competition, between 0.2 and 0.6 an 
oligopoly emerges, and if it is 0.6 or above a monopoly is 
in place.
The dominant position of market leader is another varia-
ble that we used to measure competition; it is calculated 
as the market share of the most prescribed drug in their 
group of active substances (13).
statistical analysis
The adopted quantitative methodology consists of a longi-
tudinal retrospective and descriptive analysis, calculating av-
erages of the variables before and after the introduction of 
RPS. The structure of competition was analyzed in 2 dimen-
sions: the behavior of economic agents through the number 
of presentations on the market, and the intervention of so-
cial agents, medical and pharmaceutical doctors, through 
HHI and the dominant position of the market leader.
Pearson correlation coefficient was also calculated before 
and after the introduction of RPS. This allows the determi-
nation of the association between the number of presen-
tations in the market, the HHI, and the dominant position 
of the market leader.
Data were analyzed using the SPSS, version 14 (SPSS Inc., Chi-
cago, IL, USA). Statistical analysis was performed using Wil-
coxon test for comparison of averages. For correlation study, 
we used t-test to compare the averages in the 2 groups. A P 
value <0.05 was considered statistically significant.
Results
Number of competing presentations
The number of competing presentations increased with 
the introduction of RPS from an average (±standard devia-
tion) of 10 ± 5 before the introduction of RPS to 13 ± 6 af-
ter the introduction of RPS (Table 2). However, the market 
did not achieve the conditions of perfect competition, ie, 
there were not more than 5 competing presentations for 
all homogeneous groups (Table 3). There were 2 ± 0 pres-
entations for homogeneous group lisinopril 20 mg (large 
pack) and 27 ± 2 presentations for homogeneous group 
simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack). Indeed, homogeneous 
group lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) was the only one that 
retained a monopoly profile. Homogeneous group capto-
pril 25 mg (large pack) and homogeneous group simvas-
tatin 20 mg (large pack) had 5 ± 4 and 5 ± 3 competitors 
on the market before the introduction of RPS, which in-
creased to 13 ± 1 and 14 ± 2 after the introduction of RPS, 
respectively. Homogeneous group lisinopril 20 mg (me-
dium pack) had 6 ± 0 competing presentations before the 
introduction of RPS, which decreased to 5 ± 1 after the in-
troduction of RPS.
Even if these values do not imply the absence of compe-
tition, they are borderline values and can be considered 
together with other factors in the evaluation of the nature 
of competition in this segment, since any modification of 
this parameter can yield a new framework of efficiency 
achievement.
Omeprazole (medium pack) had 19 ± 3 presentations, 
which was the greatest number of presentations before 
table 2. average values (±standard deviation) of the variables under research, before and after the introduction of the reference 
pricing system (RPs)
Variables before the introduction of RPs N after the introduction of RPs N P (t-test)
Total number of presentations 9.98 ± 5.17 225 13.3 ± 6.43 45 0.000
Number of generic presentations 4.00 ± 3.09 225 6.93 ± 4.33 45 0.000
Number of brand presentations 8.81 ± 3.78 225 9.67 ± 3.89 45 0.170
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI)* 0.32 ± 0.23 212 0.29 ± 0.24 45 0.370
HHI generics 0.68 ± 0.23 194 0.56 ± 0.26 45 0.002
HHI brands 0.39 ± 0.26 211 0.38 ± 0.29 44 0.728
Dominant position market leader† 0.42 ± 0.25 208 0.38 ± 0.22 45 0.376
*according to besanko et al (14).
†according to Puig Junoy (13).
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the introduction of RPS, while lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) 
had 1 ± 1 presentation, which was the lowest number of 
presentations. After the introduction of RPS, the simvas-
tatin 20 mg (medium pack) had the greatest number of 
27 ± 2 presentations, and lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) had 
the lowest number of 2 ± 0 presentations. The only excep-
tions were enalapril/hydrochlorothiazide and enalapril 20 
mg (medium pack), which showed no significant differ-
ence in the average number of presentations before and 
after the implementation of RPS.
Prescription concentration
After the introduction of RPS, the HHI decreased in all ho-
mogeneous groups (Table 4), which means that there was 
an increase in competition. However, the increase was not 
significant, probably because the number of observations 
after the introduction of RPS was too small.
However, we can observe 2 different competition profiles 
in the sample:
a) in the homogeneous groups where HHI was lower after 
the introduction of RPS, but remained at the same level of 
competition, ie an oligopoly according to the categories 
previously defined by Besanko et al (14) – enalapril/hydro-
chlorothiazide (HHIpre SPR = 0.49 ± 0.04; HHIpost SPR = 0.41 ± 0.00), 
fluoxetine (HHIpre SPR = 0.14 ± 0.01; HHIpost SPR = 0.12 ± 0.00), and 
ticlopidine (HHIpre SPR = 0.19 ± 0.03; HHIpost SPR = 0.15 ± 0.00).
b) in the homogeneous group where HHI decreased to lev-
els that are classified as a new kind of competition profile, 
ie, from a monopoly to an oligopoly or even the achieve-
ment of a competitive structure, which was the case in 
homogeneous groups of omeprazole 20 mg (large pack), 
simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack), and simvastatin 20 mg 
(large pack). In the homogeneous group of omeprazole, 
the HHI was 0.23 ± 0.08 before the introduction of RPS and 
dropped to 0.11 ± 0.00 after the introduction of RPS, which 
means that the oligopoly changed to a perfect competi-
tion. In the homogeneous group of simvastatin, 2 types of 
changes occurred: before the introduction of RPS monop-
oly changed to an oligopoly for the 20 mg (medium pack) 
and to a perfect competition for the 20 mg (large pack). 
The HHI was 0.71 ± 0.17 (medium pack) and 0.60 ± 0.34 
(large pack) before the introduction of RPS, and 0.41 ± 0.02 
(medium pack) and 0.15 ± 0.03 (large pack) after the intro-
duction of RPS.
Concentration of prescriptions – generics segment
The average HHI for generics decreased after the imple-
mentation of RPS, for all but one homogeneous group 
(Table 5). The values varied from 0.68 ± 0.23 to 0.56 ± 0.26. 
Before the introduction of RPS, generics segment had a 
higher concentration of prescriptions, mainly above 0.6, 
with the exception of 3 homogeneous groups. After the 
introduction of RPS, HHI decreased to values main-
ly between 0.2 and 0.6. Competition gains were 




before the  
introduction of RPs No.
after the 
introduction of RPs No.
P
(Wilcoxon test)
Captopril 25 mg (medium pack) 12 ± 0 15 7 ± 5 3 0.090
Captopril 25 mg (large pack)  5 ± 4 15 13 ± 1 3 0.051
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (large pack) 15 ± 1 15 17 ± 1 3 0.051
Enalapril:hydrochlorothiazide 20 mg:12.5 mg (medium pack)  8 ± 1 15  8 ± 1 3 –
Enalapril 20 mg (medium pack) 11 ± 1 15 11 ± 2 3 0.138
Fluoxetine 20 mg (medium pack) 12 ± 2 15 15 ± 1 3 0.051
Lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack)  6 ± 0 15  5 ± 1 3 0.051
Lisinopril 20 mg (large pack)  1 ± 1 15  2 ± 0 3 0.042
Omeprazole 20 mg (medium pack) 19 ± 3 15 22 ± 1 3 0.051
Omeprazole 20 mg (large pack)  8 ± 3 15 15 ± 1 3 0.051
Ranitidine 150 mg (large pack) 17 ± 0 15 18 ± 0 3 0.051
Ranitidine 300 mg (large pack) 15 12 ± 1 3 0.042
Simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack) 11 ± 5 15 27 ± 2 3 0.055
Simvastatin 20 mg (large pack)  5 ± 3 15 14 ± 2 3 0.051
Ticlopidine 250 mg (large pack) 11 ± 2 15 14 ± 0 3 0.042
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achieved, but not a highly competitive environment, when 
HHI dropped below 0.2. Tthe values obtained were not sig-
nificant, probably because the number of observations af-
ter the introduction of RPS was too small.
In the generic drugs segment, the market before the intro-
duction of RPS was highly concentrated, with HHI between 
0.91 ± 0.09 for the homogeneous group of ticlopidine 250 
mg (large pack) and 0.37 ± 0.05 for the homogeneous 
group of fluoxetine 20 mg (medium pack), which means 
that there was a competitive deficit in this segment. For 
the homogeneous group of simvastatin 20 mg (medium 
pack), which achieved the greatest number of presenta-
tions on the market after the introduction of RPS, the HHI 
was 0.85 ± 0.21. After the introduction of RPS, the HHI de-
creased to 0.33 ± 0.07. In this homogeneous group, the na-
ture of competition turned from a monopoly to oligopoly.
For most of the homogeneous groups, the HHI decreased 
between the two periods with the exception of capto-





introduction of RPs No.
after the 
introduction of RPs No.
P 
(Wilcoxon test)
Captopril 25 mg (medium pack) 0.38 ± 0.06 15 0.65 ± 0.27 3 0.054
Captopril 25 mg (large pack) 0.33 ± 0.13 11 0.22 ± 0.04 3 0.054
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (large pack) 0.12 ± 0.01 15 0.11 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Enalapril:hydrochlorothiazide 20 mg:12.5 mg (medium pack) 0.49 ± 0.04 15 0.41 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Enalapril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.29 ± 0.06 15 0.23 ± 0.02 3 0.054
Fluoxetine 20 mg (medium pack) 0.14 ± 0.01 15 0.12 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.35 ± 0.02 15 0.34 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) 0.85 ± 0.16  6 0.93 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Omeprazole 20 mg (medium pack) 0.15 ± 0.02 15 0.17 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Omeprazole 20 mg (large pack) 0.23 ± 0.08 15 0.11 ± 0.00 3 0.051
Ranitidine 150 mg (large pack) 0.12 ± 0.01 15 0.12 ± 0.00 3 0.142
Ranitidine 300 mg (large pack) 0.17 ± 0.01 15 0.17 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack) 0.71 ± 0.17 15 0.41 ± 0.02 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (large pack) 0.60 ± 0.34 15 0.15 ± 0.03 3 0.054
Ticlopidine 250 mg (large pack) 0.19 ± 0.03 15 0.15 ± 0.00 3 0.054
table 5. herfindahl hirschman Index (hhI) for generic drugs before and after the introduction of the reference pricing system (RPs), 
in each homogeneous group
herfindahl hirschman Index (generics)
homogeneous groups
before the 
introduction of RPs No.
after the 
introduction of RPs No.
P 
(Wilcoxon test)
Captopril 25 mg (medium pack) 0.69 ± 0.16 15 0.96 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Captopril 25 mg (large pack) 0.69 ± 0.17 11 0.61 ± 0.00 3 0.142
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (large pack) 0.52 ± 0.02 15 0.36 ± 0.03 3 0.054
Enalapril: Hydrochlorothiazide 20 mg: 12.5 mg (medium pack) 0.75 ± 0.11 15 0.74 ± 0.02 3 0.500
Enalapril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.42 ± 0.08 15 0.52 ± 0.11 3 0.500
Fluoxetine 20 mg (medium pack) 0.37 ± 0.05 15 0.26 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.97 ± 0.11 15 0.90 ± 0.17 3 0.158
Lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) 1.00 ± 0.00  6 1.00 ± 0.00 3 –
Omeprazole 20 mg (medium pack) 0.50 ± 0.03 15 0.39 ± 0.02 3 0.054
Omeprazole 20 mg (large pack) 0.65 ± 0.33 9 0.22 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Ranitidine 150 mg (large pack) 0.60 ± 0.21 15 0.43 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Ranitidine 300 mg (large pack) 0.81 ± 0.12 15 0.63 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack) 0.85 ± 0.21 12 0.33 ± 0.07 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (large pack) 0.80 ± 0.27 6 0.34 ± 0.06 3 0.054
Ticlopidine 250 mg (large pack) 0.91 ± 0.09 15 0.70 ± 0.06 3 0.054
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pril 25 mg (medium pack) because it was delisted and re-
placed by a large pack.
Although there was a change from monopoly to oligopoly 
in most homogeneous groups, due to the introduction of 
RPS, perfect competition conditions were not achieved in 
any of the homogeneous groups.
Prescription concentration – brands segment
In the brands segment, the HHI decreased in 6 homogene-
ous groups and increased in 4 homogeneous groups (Ta-
ble 6). Again the values were not significant, probably be-
cause the number of observations after the introduction of 
RPS was too small.
The average HHI in the brands segment remained stable 
after the introduction of RPS as opposed to the period be-
fore the introduction of RPS. Regarding the individual ho-
mogeneous groups, there were competition gains after the 
introduction of RPS, where 5 homogeneous groups had 
HHI below 0.2, compared with 3 homogeneous groups in 
the period before the introduction of RPS. Also the HHI val-
ues were lower than the values observed for generics seg-
ment, both before and after the introduction of RPS.
Before the introduction of RPS, the HHI in the brands seg-
ment had the lowest value of 0.14 ± 0.01 for the homoge-
neous group of ciprofloxacin 500 mg (large pack), and the 
highest one of 0.61 ± 0.02 for homogeneous group enal-
april/hydrochlorothiazide 20 mg:12.5 mg (medium pack). 
These values were lower than the ones obtained for the 
generics segment in the same period, which means that 
the level of competition was higher in the branded drugs 
segment. A decrease in this variable was observed in the 
period after the introduction of RPS for 6 homogene-
ous groups. The lowest one of 0.14 ± 0.00 was observed 
in the homogeneous group of omeprazole 20 mg (me-
dium pack), and the highest one of 0.35 ± 0.00 in the ho-
mogeneous group of lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack). For 
the remaining homogeneous groups, the HHI increased; 
namely for captopril 25 mg (medium pack), ciprofloxacin 
500 mg (large pack), enalapril/hydrochlorothiazide 20 
mg:12.5 mg (medium pack), and ranitidine 150 mg (large 
pack).
A broad approach to this indicator in the branded drugs 
segment (Table 6) allows the identification of those ho-
mogeneous groups in which the HHI decreased: fluoxet-
ine 20 mg (medium pack), lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack), 
omeprazole 20 mg (large pack), simvastatin 20 mg (large 
pack), and ticlopidine 250 mg (large pack). This shows that 
the introduction of the RPS probably raised the levels of 
competition. In spite the decrease in HHI, competitiveness 
was favored in only 4 homogeneous groups: fluoxetine, 
omeprazole, simvastatin, and ticlopidine. The homogene-
ous group of captopril 25 mg (medium pack) was the only 
one in which a high concentration was observed after the 
introduction of RPS, changing from an oligopoly to mo-
nopoly.
table 6. herfindahl hirschman Index (hhI) for branded drugs before and after the introduction of the reference pricing system 
(RPs), in each homogeneous group
herfindahl hirschman Index (brands)
homogeneous groups
before the
introduction of RPs No.
after the 
introduction of RPs No.
P 
(Wilcoxon test)
Captopril 25 mg (medium pack) 0.53 ± 0.15 15 0.94 ± 0.08 2 0.090
Captopril 25 mg (large pack) 0.61 ± 0.34 11 0.27 ± 0.12 3 0.054
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (large pack) 0.14 ± 0.01 15 0.17 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Enalapril:hydrochlorothiazide 20 mg:12.5 mg (medium pack) 0.61 ± 0.02 15 0.63 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Enalapril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.39 ± 0.01 15 0.38 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Fluoxetine 20 mg (medium pack) 0.22 ± 0.02 15 0.19 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.38 ± 0.01 15 0.35 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) 1.00 ± 0.00  5 1.00 ± 0.00 3 –
Omeprazole 20 mg (medium pack) 0.17 ± 0.01 15 0.14 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Omeprazole 20 mg (large pack) 0.26 ± 0.05 15 0.19 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Ranitidine 150 mg (large pack) 0.14 ± 0.00 15 0.15 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Ranitidine 300 mg (large pack) 0.22 ± 0.01 15 0.22 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack) 0.86 ± 0.06 15 0.80 ± 0.03 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (large pack) 0.61 ± 0.32 15 0.21 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Ticlopidine 250 mg (large pack) 0.21 ± 0.02 15 0.19 ± 0.00 3 0.054
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dominant position of the market leader
The pattern of dominant positions of market leaders 
changed after the introduction of RPS (Table 7), but the 
difference was not significant. For 3 homogeneous groups, 
the dominant position of the market leader increased, but 
the highest value observed was 0.35, well below the 0.4 
value of a monopolistic market (Table 2).
In the other 8 homogeneous groups, where the value de-
creased; we identified 3 different profiles:
a) the dominant position remained higher than 0.4 in enal-
april/hydrochlorothiazide (from 0.68 ± 0.04 to 0.59 ± 0.00), 
enalapril (from 0.49 ± 0.07 to 0.39 ± 0.02), and lisinopril 20 
mg (medium pack) (from 0.50 ± 0.02 to 0.47 ± 0.01);
b) the dominant position decreased from 0.64 ± 0.35 to 
0.26 ± 0.07 for simvastatin 20 mg (large pack);
c) the dominant position remained below 0.4 for ranitidine 
150 mg and ticlopidine 250 mg.
We can assume that competition gains were obtained only 
in the case of the homogeneous group of simvastatin 20 
mg (large pack).
Correlation analysis
There was a significant negative correlation between the 
total number of competing presentations and HHI (from 
-0.65 to -0.56 after the introduction of RPS); we can see the 
same situation in the case of the total number of compet-
table 7. dominant position of market leader before and after the introduction of the reference pricing system (RPs) in each homo-
geneous group












Captopril 25 mg (medium pack) 0.58 ± 0.04 15 0.52 ± 0.08 3 0.142
Captopril 25 mg (large pack) 0.36 ± 0.14 9 0.33 ± 0.15 3 0.500
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg (large pack) 0.17 ± 0.03 15 0.12 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Enalapril:hydrochlorothiazide 20 mg:12.5 mg (medium pack) 0.68 ± 0.04 15 0.59 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Enalapril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.49 ± 0.07 15 0.39 ± 0.02 3 0.054
Fluoxetine 20 mg (medium pack) 0.18 ± 0.03 15 0.23 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (medium pack) 0.50 ± 0.02 15 0.47 ± 0.01 3 0.054
Lisinopril 20 mg (large pack) 0.96 ± 0.00  4 0.96 ± 0.00 3 –
Omeprazole 20 mg (medium pack) 0.17 ± 0.04 15 0.35 ± 0.02 3 0.054
Omeprazole 20 mg (large pack) 0.30 ± 0.10 15 0.19 ± 0.04 3 0.054
Ranitidine 150 mg (large pack) 0.21 ± 0.02 15 0.17 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Ranitidine 300 mg (large pack) 0.24 ± 0.04 15 0.28 ± 0.00 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (medium pack) 0.82 ± 0.11 15 0.61 ± 0.02 3 0.054
Simvastatin 20 mg (large pack) 0.64 ± 0.35 15 0.26 ± 0.07 3 0.054
Ticlopidine 250 mg (large pack) 0.32 ± 0.04 15 0.25 ± 0.00 3 0.054
table 8. Pearson coefficients correlation between the number of presentations. hhI, and the dominant position of market leader, 
before and after the introduction of the reference pricing system (RPs)*
Variables before the introduction of RPs No. after the introduction of RPs No.
Number of total presentations:
HHI -0.65†  212 -0.56†  45
DP market leader -0.39†  208 -0.40†  45
Number of generic presentations:
HHI generics -0.56†  225 -0.76†  45
HHI brands -0.16‡  211 -0.146  44
DP market leader -0.32†  208 -0.21  45
*abbreviations: hhI – herfindahl hirschman Index; dP – dominant position; RPs – Reference pricing system; N – number of observations.
†P < 0.01.
‡P < 0.05.
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ing presentations and the dominant position of the market 
leader (from -0.39 to -0.40 after the introduction of RPS) 
(Table 8). A significant negative association was also ob-
tained for the total number of generic presentations and 
HHI in the generics segment (from -0.56 to -0.76 after the 
introduction of RPS).
So, we also conclude that when an increase in the number of 
competitors in the market is observed, the prescription con-
centration decreases. However, a different conclusion was 
obtained regarding the association between the number of 
generics presentations and HHI in the brands segment and 
the dominant position of the market leader. None of the var-
iables were significantly correlated with the number of ge-
neric presentations after the introduction of RPS.
dIsCussIoN
We observed that after the introduction of the RPS, there 
was a new market structure, compatible with competition 
gains:
a) The number of competing presentations increased.
b) The prescription concentration decreased.
c) The dominant position of market leader decreased.
In fact, when the number of presentations increases, there 
is a potential advantage of pricing decrease, which could 
promote consumption according to the price elasticity of 
demand. As a result, the segmentation of drugs demand 
may contribute to the decrease in prescription concentra-
tion, possibly targeting the dominant position of market 
leader and decreasing it.
We found a significant association between the number 
of presentations and the prescription concentration be-
fore and after the introduction of RPS, and also between 
the number of presentations and the dominant position of 
market leader. Considering Pearson coefficient, we found 
that after the introduction of RPS the association with the 
number of presentations remained negative for both HHI 
(from -0.65 to -0.56) and dominant position of market lead-
er (from -0.39 to -0.40), but there was a change in the mag-
nitude of association. There was a decrease in HHI, but also 
an increase in the dominant position of market leader.
So, the number of presentations – that increased after 
the introduction of RPS – seems to be the driving force of 
competition on the Portuguese pharmaceutical market. In 
fact, the results suggest that after the introduction of RPS, 
the prescribers changed their behavior, namely prescrib-
ing other drugs than market leaders in the homogeneous 
group, which usually are brands.
Regarding the association between the number of gener-
ics and the dominant position of market leader, as well as 
HHI for generics and HHI for brands, we found a new asso-
ciation profile. In fact, the association between the number 
of generics and the dominant position of market leader, 
before and after the introduction of RPS, decreased from 
-0.32 to -0.21. Compared with the results obtained for the 
association between the number of total presentations 
and the dominant position of market leader, it seems that 
generics had a lower impact on the dominant position of 
market leader than the total number of presentations af-
ter the introduction of RPS. These values may suggest de-
mand segmentation. Even in the presence of generics, as 
alternatives with lower prices, there is still a segment of 
consumers that prefer brand drugs.
Regarding the association between the number of gener-
ics and the HHI for generics, there was an increase from 
-0.56 to -0.76, however in the brands segment the associa-
tion remained basically unchanged. Here again we found 
evidence that the impact of generics after the introduction 
of RPS was higher in the generics market segment than in 
the brands segment.
Regarding this topic, Pavcnick’s found a negative correla-
tion between HHI and the number of generics on the Ger-
man market: -0.89 for oral antidiabetics and -0.86 for drugs 
for peptic ulcer disease (15). These values are higher than 
those obtained for Portuguese market, which could be 
compatible with a higher impact of RPS in Germany than 
in Portugal.
The obtained results revealed that both economic and so-
cial agents reacted immediately to the RPS. The former in-
duced the entry of generics at the market and the latter 
changed their prescription patterns.
However, it is not enough to modify the economic or so-
cial agents’ behaviors to increase competition in the phar-
maceutical market, and promote cost containment as the 
main goal of RPS. It is also necessary that social agents, 
both prescribers and consumers, are well informed 
about the benefits of the system, and switch their pref-
erences to the lowest priced drugs, with the same 
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active substance. This, in turn, could possibly decrease 
both the HHI and the dominant positions for generics and 
brands market segments. Only by optimizing the full de-
mand of drugs, considering the opportunities promoted 
by the economic agents, it will be possible for RPS to foster 
efficiency through increased competition.
Nonetheless, the present research revealed a competition 
deficit induced by social agents in the brands segment. Re-
gardless of the fact that HHI values decreased after the in-
troduction of RPS, meaning that drugs from a wide range of 
presentations were prescribed, they were not low enough 
to overcome the dominant positions already established 
before the introduction of the RPS. The association be-
tween HHI for brands and the number of generic presen-
tations – according to Pearson coefficient – was negative 
but weak, and remained basically unchanged after the in-
troduction of RPS. This fact shows that gains in efficiency 
are only partially obtained in brands segment, even after 
the entry of new generic presentations to the market.
Considering all the homogeneous groups in the sample, 
we saw no common pattern. However there are two ho-
mogeneous groups that deserve special attention. In the 
homogeneous group of simvastatin, the major gains re-
garding competition were achieved. Simvastatin had sec-
ond pharmaceutical expenditure in the RPS in Portugal 
after omeprazole. In this case we observed the greatest 
number of presentations in the sample after the introduc-
tion of RPS and the largest decrease in prescription con-
centration: in one of the homogeneous groups from mo-
nopoly to oligopoly and in the other from oligopoly to 
competition. The largest HHI decrease was observed in the 
generics segment.
We can summarize that competition gains were achieved 
in the generics market segment but not in the brands seg-
ment.
The RPS reimbursement system intends to promote the 
consumption of drugs that have the lowest copayment 
for consumers. This occurs when the drug with the low-
est price is preferred in the RPS environment of chemical-
ly similar drugs. So, RPS is perceived as an opportunity for 
economic agents, with new market segments emerging 
for price-sensitive consumers.
The limited number of observations after the introduc-
tion of RPS is a limitation of this study, which we can be 
overcome with a larger sample. Also, as we deal with 
time series data, another kind of specific analysis should 
be performed.
Our data allow the conclusion that not all players act ac-
cording to the goals of the system. An improvement in the 
incentives system is needed, tailored to improve the be-
havior of those agents that could contribute to overcome 
this constraint.
As mentioned by Segura (1), RPS has a really great potential 
to control pharmaceutical expenditure but only if it is well 
integrated in a pharmaceutical policy fostering an active 
contribution of all the agents in the pharmaceutical chain.
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